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Summary 
 
 The competition policy is an area of law that moulds itself according to the structure of 
the society and evolves by habitually adjusting to the dynamics of the national economies. Due 
to various historical contexts as well as to the distinct economic systems, the competition law in 
EU and Japan walked on different paths at different rhythms.  However, in both jurisdictions the 
dissimilarities have been built on the same foundation – the desire to ensure the consumer 
welfare and to preserve a free and fair competitive environment. 
Exploitative abuses are practices that inflict harm directly on consumers and despite the 
fact that in EU such practices have not garnered much awareness in the past three decades their 
negative effects on the market cannot be overlooked. In EU law the exploitative conducts fall 
under article 102 TFEU which prohibits any abusive behaviour within the internal market 
committed by a dominant undertaking. In Japan, exploitative conducts are covered by two 
provisions within the Anti Monopoly Act: private monopolization by control and unfair trade 
practices.   
The concept private monopolization by control depicts the business activity by means of 
which an entity, or a group of entities, substantially restricts competition in a particular field by 
controlling the business activities of other enterprises. Substantial restraint of competition is the 
Japanese correspondent for dominant position, both notions requiring a certain degree of market 
power. However while in the case of dominant position the market power is a prerequisite 
element of the abuse, substantial restraint of competition is judged based on the aftermaths of the 
abusive practice.  
Unlike its EU counterpart, private monopolization can be executed by indirect control 
also. Indirect control illustrates a situation in which a certain undertaking is so influential over a 
market that its behaviour works like a Ripple effect dictating the conditions of the market.  
When the abusive conduct carried out by an undertaking does not substantially restrict 
competition, but does however tend to impede competition then it could be classified as an unfair 
trade practice. The unfair trade practices are listed by the JFTC in a designation notice and are 
conducts that have a tendency to jeopardize competition on merits. Due to the fact that market 
power is irrelevant when identifying these practices it is unlikely that by EU standards they 
would be found infringing article 102 TFEU. Moreover, among them there are a few types of 
conducts that in EU would depart from the realm of competition law.  
The abuse of superior bargaining position has been one of the main priorities pursued by 
the JFTC in the past few years and covers abuses executed by retailers against suppliers. In EU 
the concept is known as abuse of dominant buyer power and as confirmed by the CJEU can 
amount to a breach of article 102 TFEU.    
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
 
I.1 General introduction 
Across the Globe competition law today is a plethora of rules. While in the 28 member 
states of the European Union (EU), through the efforts exerted by the Commission, a certain 
degree of uniformity has been established, beyond the borders of the union the competition 
policy is characterized by diversity, with every state adopting a legislation adjusted to their 
economical structure and historical heritage. As a result, international companies that have 
branches in more than one jurisdiction might find themselves in a predicament regarding which 
rules they need to abide by and where. The more a certain undertaking expands its business 
activity the deeper the doctrinal puzzlement it encounters.  
This study is build around the competition policies of two major jurisdictions – EU and 
one of its most important trading partners, Japan – and is focused on the concept of exploitative 
abuse of dominant position and its Japanese counterparts Private Monopolization by control and 
Unfair Trade Practices. Once the EU competition law has crossed the thresholds into a modern 
era, the Commission’s interest towards the abuses exploitative in character seems to have been 
unmoored from its enforcement priorities. However, in both jurisdictions, due to their immediate 
results, undertakings find it at hand to employ such practices and their severe outcomes cannot 
be undermined especially when considering that the harm is inflicted straight on the consumers. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light over the enforcement against exploitative abuses 
in EU and Japan and to shape a comprehensive theoretical model of the concept by pointing out 
the similarities, the differences and the peculiarities of the legislations in the two jurisdictions.        
I.2 The research question and the hypothesis 
The main research question on which the herein study will be constructed around is how 
does the EU approach on the legal concept of exploitative abuse of dominant position reflect in 
the competition policy of Japan and what are the differences and similarities generated in regard 
to its enforcement in the two jurisdictions?  
In order to properly understand such similarities or differences a series of sub-questions 
will need to be addressed.  The first one would be - how has the competition policy in the EU 
and Japan evolved over time? The study will explore the historical development process of the 
competition law in the two areas from the moment the first provisions were inscribed on paper in 
the post war period and until the latest amendments to date.  
The second sub-question pertinent to this research is what are the main structural 
features of the Japanese competition law and what are their correspondents in EU law? The 
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approach adopted in answering this question is presenting the Japanese Anti Monopoly Act 
through an European filter. 
In order to answer the main research question it is of paramount necessity to identify how 
dominant position reflects in the AMA provisions and if the method of implementing it follows 
or otherwise departs from the European process. Thus, the third sub-question – what is the 
approach adopted by the two jurisdictions regarding the concepts of dominant position, 
substantial restraint of trade and tendency to impede competition? – bears intrinsic relevance for 
the purpose of this research.  
The forth and last sub-question would be what are the commonalities and dissimilarities 
between the concept of exploitative abuse and its Japanese counterparts private monopolization 
by control and exploitative unfair trade practice? The main forms of such conducts will be 
analyzed in parallel by pointing out the similarities and the peculiarities specific to each 
jurisdiction.  
  The hypothesis from which this study proceeds forward is that while in both EU and 
Japan the treatment towards exploitative conducts has a lot of communalities, at the same time a 
lot of peculiarities specific to each jurisdiction arise.  
I.3 Method and materials 
The methodology followed into creating this study was the library-based qualitative 
research. The first step employed was collecting the relevant information in connection with 
exploitative abuses in EU and Japan, by inspecting different sources of material like books, 
legislations, guidelines, articles, court decisions and various orders or decisions issued by the 
competition authorities. The second step was the analysis of the gathered information by 
structurally separating it according to the research plan and by determining the essential features 
that are going to be emphasized. Additionally, a second method has been utilized – the 
comparative method – which entails processing the information in parallel for both EU and Japan 
and pinpointing the common features as well as the distinguishable traits specific in the two 
jurisdictions. The process implies synthesizing the Japanese competition policy from the familiar 
perspective of EU competition law.  
While the European Commission (“the Commission”) may not have displayed much 
concern towards exploitative abuses in the past few years, nonetheless gathering information 
about EU law did not prove to be a daunting challenge at all. Among the many books published 
on EU competition law the ones that inspired me the most and which were predominantly used 
during this research are “EU Competition Law. Text, Cases, and Materials” authored by Alison 
Jones and Brenda Sufrin and “European Competition Law: A Practitioner's Guide” written 
Lennart Ritter and W. David Braun. An essential role within the comparison was played by the 
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case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the EU treaties as well as other 
secondary sources of law like the Commission’s guidance papers. 
The research materials available in English in connection to the Japanese competition law 
were not as abundant. The main source of information was the English version of the website of 
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), which contains a large data base of cease and 
desist orders, warnings and recommendations issued to companies as well as the articles, reports, 
the Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) and other relevant acts and guidelines. Furthermore, the literary 
works of Mitsuo Matsushita, professor at Tokyo University, provided an insightful perspective 
over the purpose, content and functionality of the AMA provisions.    
I.4 Delimitations 
Competition law is a vast field of law, comprised of a wide array of issues and concepts. 
While other concepts like unreasonable restraint of trade (cartels and other horizontal 
agreements) and private monopolization by exclusion (exclusionary abuse of dominant position) 
are cursorily introduced within Chapter III, the study deals predominantly with the notion of 
exploitative abuse of dominant position and its Japanese correspondents private monopolization 
by control and exploitative unfair trade practices. Thus, issues related to mergers or acquisitions 
will not be addressed at all.  
Furthermore, the research will focus only around the two territories mentioned - EU and 
Japan -, no reference to elements specific to competition policies pertaining to other jurisdictions 
will be addressed.  Likewise, national legislation or case-law sprouted from the members states 
will not be covered by this study, as the European dimension will be considered only at the 
Union level.  
Lastly, the research will revolve around comparing the characteristics and the intrinsic 
purposes of the elements composing the notion of exploitative abuse of dominant position and its 
Japanese counterparts. It will deal exclusively with the meanings behind the legal provisions as 
well as with their application; however it will not touch at all upon any procedural aspects 
employed by the Commission or by the JFTC.           
I.5 Disposition 
In the light of the research questions this study has been designed to comprise 5 chapters. 
The second chapter portrays a chronological evolution of the competition policies in EU and 
Japan by focusing on the major key moments that carved their print into what it is today 
competition law. The ups and downs of the policy enforcement will be depicted as well as the 
incongruities arising against the social and historical background.  
The third chapter commences by firstly designating the aims and the purposes that 
competition law seeks to accomplish in the two territories. The pawns running around the 
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competition law board are enterprises and undertakings. Understanding who these pawns are is 
crucial for the rest of the analysis, thus the chapter continues by taking a general look into the 
concepts of undertaking/enterprise. The central pillars of the Japanese competition law - 
monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade, unfair trade practices - are also presented within 
the third chapter in the light of their European correspondents.   
The forth chapter addresses the central research question of the paper and is separated 
into two subchapters. The first subchapter contains a comparative assessment of the concepts of 
dominant position, substantial restraint of competition and tendency to impede competition. The 
second part deals with various forms of exploitative abuses and examines their projection into 
reality by taking a look at the cases pursued by the JFTC or the Commission. 
The fifth and the last chapter sets forward the conclusions reached as a result of the 
research. In the light of the comparative analysis engaged within the study answers to the 
research questions will be provided accompanied by an overall view over the outcome of the 
paper.  
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Chapter II Historical Background and development of the provisions 
 
 
II.1 The post war period - the foundation of the competition policies in EU 
and Japan 
The birth of competition law can be pinpointed in the period following the Second World 
War, for both jurisdiction – Japan and the European Union, union which at that point was in its 
inception phase. It can be said in fact that competition law in the EU has come into existence and 
developed in parallel with the union itself and from the onset it has been regarded as a weapon to 
protect and maintain the internal market. 
In Europe, in order to cool off the aftermaths of the war the so-called European 
integration process was set into motion and the first step was the creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community which had as its primary goal the de facto partnership between Germany, 
France and other European states in the area of coal and steel. Thus, by the means of the Treaty 
of Paris in 1951, the aspiration towards the “United States of Europe” has planted its seed and 
together with it the first competition law provisions applicable at an European level were shaped 
into their incipient form within the article 65 and 66. The inter-war period was characterized by a 
high degree of tolerance towards cartels which together with the geographical price 
discrimination and the national trade barriers amounted to a distortion of the common market on 
the two markets.
1
 The perceptions towards cartels, which were inherent in the economic structure 
at the time, changed. They began to be regarded as a malignant tumour which led to the 
elimination of competition and exploitation of the markets, practices which were not serving the 
public interest. The reasoning behind introducing a supra-national competition dimension was 
without a doubt the fight against cartels, with the High Authority being entrusted with the 
mission to create market conditions specific to perfect competition
2
.        
On the other side of the world, in Japan the first piece of competition regulation was 
enacted also in the post World War II (WWII) period, more specifically in 1947; however the 
purpose behind it was somewhat different from the one on the European land. During the heavy 
industrialization of Japan which started in the late nineteenth century, the government itself was 
the one that managed the key industries and in the following period decided to sell them at 
extremely low prices to companies operating in the private sectors. This led to the creation of the 
                                                          
1
 Laurent Warlouzet, The Rise of European Competition Policy, 1950-1991: A Cross-Disciplinary Survey of a 
Contested Policy Sphere, European University Institute, Florence, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, 
p.7  
2
 Anca D Chiriță, A Legal Historical Review of the EU Competition Rules, International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 63 ICLQ 2 (2014) 
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so-called zaibatsus (財閥), the family-dominated combines with substantial market shares3,  and 
to the monopolization of the whole Japanese economy
4
. According to Mitsuo Matsushita, 
professor of law at the Tokyo University, the zaibatsus were “very large industrial conglomerates 
composed of many enterprises engaged in various industries controlled by a head company and 
linked through mutual stock holdings and interlocking directorates”5. Unlike Europe, where the 
cartels were merely tolerated in the inter-war period, in Japan in the 1930
th
 the different 
legislations adopted created the perfect environment and actually encouraged the establishment 
of cartels. Until late 1970
th
 some of cartels were formed and operated under the guidance of the 
government through its ministries.
6
  Highly concentrated markets were not seen as being harmful 
and in 1942 there were 17 zaibatsus in Japan that dominated the economy. Japan was actively 
promoting a monopolistic system
7
  and it is believed by some authors that even the “uniquely 
Japanese system” - main bank system, close government industry relation and life-long 
employment - prevalent today in the Japanese society has its roots in that monopolistic system 
and in that period.
8
   
The situation, however, saw a great turn of events once the WWII ended, with Japan 
entering a period of political and economic reform under the supervision of the Occupational 
Forces whose central pillar were the United States of America. The democratization process 
which was more or less imposed on Japan targeted three major fields – agriculture, labour and 
industry- and was never intended to create an economically flourishing Japan, but rather to 
eliminate any trade barriers for foreign undertakings. The zaibatsus and their practices were seen 
by the United States as the driving force behind the “foreign aggression” that characterized the 
Japanese society at the time, and their dissolution became the primary goal of the economic 
democratization.
9
 In the context of dismantling the zaibatsus the Act on Prohibition of Private 
Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (私的独占の禁止及び公正取引の確保に関す
る法律 – Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kousei torihiki no kakuho nikansuru houritsu), simply 
known as the Antimonopoly Act (AMA) came into existence together with the Japanese Fair 
Trade Commission (JFTC) the government agency, with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative 
powers that was in charge of implementing the antitrust law.
10
  
Compared to the goal pursued by the newly established European Union through its 
competition provisions, which was basically the fight against cartels in order to ensure market 
integration, the Japanese AMA was seeking to establish a “free enterprise system” in a new 
                                                          
3
 Alex Y. Seita, Jiro Tamura, The historical background of Japan’s Antimonopoly Act, University of Illinois Law 
Review, Vol. 1994, No. 115, 1994  
4
 Oda Hiroshi, Japanese Law, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.327 
5
 Matsushita Mitsuo, International Trade and Competition Law in Japan, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 76 
6
 Alex Y. Seita, Jiro Tamura, Idem 3, p. 327, p. 342 
7
 Matsushita Mitsuo, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, Global Competition Policy, Institute for International 
Economics, p. 151-199, p. 151 
8
 Y.Noguchi, “1940 Nendai Taisei (The 1940th Regime)”, Tokyo, 1995, quoted by Hiroshi Yoda in Japanese Law 
9
 Alex Y. Seita, Jiro Tamura, Idem 3 
10
Oda Hiroshi, Idem 4, p. 327 
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economically deconcentrated Japan. Although the danger of concentrations arising was foreseen, 
the first EU antitrust provisions were mainly prohibiting agreements, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices that tend to prevent, distort or restrict competition, with 
weak provisions against monopolizations of markets or economic concentrations included in 
article 66 of the ECSC.
11
 On the other hand the AMA appeared to focus more on prohibiting 
practices like private monopolization and unfair trade practices (provisions which are generally 
associated with the later abuse of dominance concept), rather than cartels
12
.  
The original AMA was shaped greatly after its American counterpart The Sherman Act 
but the content was considered by many to be harsher and more stringent, as during the 
occupation the attempt was to implement in Japan a model that was envisaged by the Americans 
but failed to be wholly introduced in the USA.
13
 Levelling down the Japanese economy was the 
aim envisaged by means of a piece of legislation that never existed before nor after for that 
matter in any other jurisdiction. Bigness was condemned just for being big, large size was 
considered in itself the evil of all evils. Among the restrictions worth mentioning are the per se 
illegality of establishing a holding company, ban on non-financial companies to create 
subsidiaries or to engage in joint ventures, ban of large intercompany loans and on holding 
executive positions in more than one company. The original form of what today are “abuse of 
superior bargaining position” and “monopolistic situations” provisions was the “undue disparity 
of bargaining power”, however what was condemned was not the abuse of it but the disparity 
itself and the act conferred the JFTC competence to take any action it finds suited were such a 
situation to arise. The provision was probably the most surprising part of the AMA as it was 
according to some authors simply “attacking bigness for bigness’s sake”.14 
The perception at the moment was that by adopting a more potent antitrust law than in the 
USA, the ultimate goal was to create in Japan an ideal business environment, radically different 
from the previous traditional system but in the end while the aspiration was noble at its core the 
practicability proved to be just a dream. Naturally the incompatibility between the Japanese 
society and the extreme stringent provisions included in the AMA led to its amendment to a new 
version in 1953 immediately after the end of the occupation period.
15
 To state that the new 
version was more relaxed compared to the original one should be considered an understatement, 
as cartels were no longer prohibited per se, but only if they caused a “substantial restrained of 
competition”, “depression cartels” and “rationalization cartels” were permitted whereas article 8 
concerning  “undue disparity of bargaining power” was simply repealed in its entirety. However 
the amendment did not seek to bury competition altogether and resort to the old traditional 
                                                          
11
 The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
12
 Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947) 
13
 Oda Hiroshi, idem 4,  p.328 
14
 Dan F. Henderson, Foreign Enterprise in Japan: law and policies, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina 
Press, 1973, p.151 
15
 Alex Y. Seita, Jiro Tamura, The historical background of Japan’s Antimonopoly Act, University of Illinois Law 
Review, Vol. 1994, No. 115, 1994, p.167 
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Japanese practices as the regulations regarding “unfair business practices” were somewhat 
widened to include further practices in order to protect small enterprises from the abusive 
behaviour of large enterprises.
16
 
 
II.2 The intermediate period – the broadening of the horizons 
After its implementation in Japan, the AMA was ambitiously and somewhat unnaturally 
strongly enforced by JFTC under the pressure of the Occupational Forces until 1950, but in 
reality it is said that its application within the first two decades was anaemic at best.
17
 While the 
Japanese were reluctant to the AMA as it appeared to stand against everything they previously 
thought good for their economy, in Europe, following the enactment of the ECSC, the situation 
was characterized by confusion and ignorance in what concerned the role of the competition 
rules in the bigger picture. It is in that context that the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome were 
set into motion. The common market was still the ultimate goal and its establishment was to be 
based on free movement regulations backed up by competition rules which were supposed to 
annihilate private barriers to trade.
18
 
This idea was fully developed in the so-called Spaak report which is considered a 
preparatory work for the future Treaty of Rome (the EC Treaty). Furthermore, the report build up 
the basis of a de minimis criterion by stating that it is necessary first to identify practices that 
affect the cross-border competition and afterwards, whether such distortions are a real and 
serious threat to the competition relations.
19
 The EC Treaty which officially gave life to the 
European Economic Community was signed in 1957 and entered into force on the 1
st
 of January 
1958, laying the basis also for what is today the EU Competition law. Unlike the ESCS Treaty’s 
antitrust provisions which were influenced by the American antitrust legislation, during the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Rome, the drafters chose to ignore the anti monopoly pattern 
specific to the Sherman Act although the possibility of adopting it was mentioned in the Spaak 
Report. The German delegation strongly opposed a law prohibiting monopolies or market 
dominance per se based on the view that the struggle of the undertakings to acquire market 
power could be an effective force to create a dynamic competition environment. It was in this 
context that the German suggestion to prohibit abuse of dominant market power found support 
even though it was a vague concept characterized by uncertainty in what it concerned 
applicability since at the time there was no “model” tested in other jurisdictions.  
                                                          
16
 Matsushita Mitsuo, idem 5, p. 80 
17
 Simon Vande Walle, Tadashi Shiraishi, Competition Law in Japan, January 1, 2015,  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2219881  
18
 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Mel Marquis, European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to 
Article 82 EC, First Edition, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 128  
19
 Carl Michael Quitzow, State measures distorting free competition in the EC: a study of the need for a new 
Community policy towards anti-competitive State measures in the EMU perspective, European business law & 
practice series, 2002, p. 7-8 
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The German Ordoliberalism doctrine seemed to have made its way into the new 
competition regulations, its beliefs being transposed especially by means of article 82 EC 
Treaty.
20
 The French delegation had a victory of its own during the negotiations as the EC Treaty 
did not provide any insight as to how and by whom the provisions were to be enforced. That 
changed with the introduction of the Council Regulation 17/62 in 1962 which founded a 
centralized enforcement system with the Commission (Directorate General for Competition – 
DG COMP) endowed with the power to ensure the applicability of the provisions. Despite the 
fact that the following period was characterized by some of the most seminal court decisions 
made by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the development of competition in 
the EU was somewhat slow. The Commission found itself bogged up due to the mandatory 
notification system and its exclusive competence to apply article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. In order 
to counteract that and to speed up the case management time the Commission adopted a series of 
tools like the block exemption regulations, guidelines, negative clearance decisions, de minimis 
notices etc.
21
   
Article 82 was not even once enforced in the first decade of its existence and many 
commentators at the time believed that the only purpose it served was to prevent exploitative 
abuses. The Continental Can Case changed that view and future case law went even further to 
opening new doors for the application of article 82 of the EC Treaty.
22
 Among the judicial 
decisions worth mentioning are Hoffman-La Roche, in which the CJEU explained for the first 
time how the concept of abuse should be understood
23
, and Michelin I which introduced the so-
called “special responsibility” that an undertaking acquires by default once it becomes 
dominant
24
.     
In Japan, the practices pursued by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (通商
産業省- tsuushou sangyoushou - MITI) of not only encouraging cartelization, but actually 
offering guidance and sponsoring them, resulted in an ongoing intense friction between the 
ministry and the JFTC.
25
 Despite the circumstances, in 1960 the AMA and its enforcement 
started to gain public sympathy as due to the existence of the price-fixing cartels and resale price 
maintenance practices between retailers and manufacturers, the consumer prices were 
continuously rising, leading to a high inflation index. The JFTC seized the auspicious moment by 
organizing a task force and in 1977 the AMA was strengthened, the most notable change being 
                                                          
20
 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Mel Marquis, European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to 
Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 133-135 
21
 Damien Geradin, Dr Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics, Hardback, 2012, 
p.17  
22
 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Mel Marquis, idem 20, p. 140 
23
 Case C-85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission [1979], EU:C:1979:36, para.91 
24
 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission[1983], EU:C:1983:313, para. 57 
25
 Alex Y. Seita, Jiro Tamura, idem 15, p. 180 
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the introduction of financial penalties – a surcharge of 2% from the turnover - on undertakings 
taking part in cartels that affected prices
26
.  
Although at the time the attention seemed to have shifted towards the prevention of cartel 
practices, regulations of monopolistic situations have been reintroduced. The old provisions 
regarding imbalance of economic power between enterprises has been implemented again in the 
shape of a new system of “structure control”, under which the JFTC was authorized to impose 
certain measures, or in extreme cases deconcentration orders, whenever one company had a 
market share of 50% or above or two companies together owned 75% or more market shares and 
new entry into the market was difficult.
27
   
Despite the fact that the AMA had a more strong content its application continued to be 
weak. The United States saw the lax application as one of the reasons behind the 
disproportionate trading relationship between the two countries and during the US-Japan 
Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) negotiations (1989-1990) the AMA and its 
implementation have been reviewed. As a response to the SII report in 1991 the Japanese 
authorities increased the administrative surcharge to 6% from the turnover and by the end of the 
year “The Anti Monopoly Act Guidelines on Distribution and Trade Practices” has been 
published. The number of cases handled by the JFTC yearly has also increased.
28
 Moreover the 
JFTC publicly declared that criminal proceedings were to be initiated whenever necessary and   
for the first time since the 1970s criminal proceedings were started against a cartel.
29
 
II.3 The “coming of age” period – the path towards modernization 
In Europe, in 1999 the Commission made an overall assessment of its enforcement 
activity that far and issued the “White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty”. The result was gloomy and disappointing as it turned out 
that most of the investigations the Commission engaged in were concerning harmless agreements 
and the notification system employed that far was extremely costly. Due to the Commission’s 
exclusive competence over notifications and exemptions, a large number of agreements were 
reported however hardly any of them were posing any real threats to competition.  In this context, 
the Regulation 1/2003 was adopted to replace Regulation 72/62. The new regulation basically 
“decentralized” the previous “centralized” enforcement system. The notification system was 
abolished and the burden shifted onto the undertakings that now need to self-assess the possible 
antitrust threats comprised in their agreements.  Moreover, the Commission’s monopoly over the 
exemptions in article 82(3) was dissolved; National Competition Authorities of the Member 
States can now make use of the provision also. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2009 did not bring any major changes, the competition provisions remained remarkably stable 
                                                          
26
 Kameoka Etsuko, Competition Law and Policy in Japan and the EU, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014, p. 15 
27
 Matsushita Mitsuo, idem 5, p. 82 
28
 Matsushita Mitsuo, idem 7, p. 155-156 
29
 Oda Hiroshi, idem 4, p. 329 
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over the past years. The common market became internal market and the new numbering of the 
competition articles are 101 and 102.
30
 
The “coming of age” of the Japanese antitrust law took place in 2005 when the provisions 
have been firmly revitalized towards a modern system. The surcharges have been increased to 
10%, a leniency program has been introduced and the previous “medieval” investigative 
proceedings conducted by the JFTC have been adapted to a modern approach.
31
 In the following 
period the prevention of unfair trade practices started to garner more and more attention and by 
the 2009 amendment of the AMA the surcharges imposed on companies engaged in practices 
falling under those prohibitions were increased.
32
 The latest amendment, concerning only 
institutional and procedural matters, was passed by the Japanese Diet in December 2013. The 
amendment is not into effect yet as the Cabinet has not issued any Order regarding it.
33
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Chapter III Outline and general provisions of the Anti Monopoly Act 
 
III.1 The goals and the aims pursued by the competition policies in EU and 
Japan 
Although the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) does not 
specifically make any mentions regarding the objectives pursued by the competition policy, the 
common perception in literature is that the first and foremost goal of the modern competition 
approach is consumer welfare followed by economic efficiency. In addition, depending on the 
situation, other objectives may spring forth into the realm of EU competition law, among which 
worth mentioning are market integration, effective competition, economic freedom and 
protection of competitors and fair competition, SME protection, productivity growth, public 
policy etc.
34
   
At the first glance it might seem that the AMA adheres to a different approach as in 
article 1 it declares that its purpose is “to promote fair and free competition, stimulate the 
creative initiative of enterprises, encourage business activity, heighten the level of employment 
and actual national income, and thereby promote the democratic and wholesome development of 
the national economy as well as secure the interests of general consumers by prohibiting private 
monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade and unfair trade practices, preventing excessive 
concentration of economic power and eliminating unreasonable restraints on production, sale, 
price, technology, etc., and all other unjust restrictions on business activity through combinations, 
agreements, etc.”. Although the focus of the provision seems to revolve around economic growth 
and effective competition, some opinions are that the ultimate objectives are the development of 
national economy and the interest of the consumer. The achievement of the ultimate goals is 
backed up by the so-called direct objectives represented by the promotion of fair and free 
competition, while the instruments implemented by the AMA in the pursuit of these aims are the 
prohibition of the anticompetitive practices. Thus, unlike the EU vision, where it appears that 
consumer welfare is the sole leading objective, in Japan the consumer dimension is accompanied 
by concern for national economy, while all the other elements are just means to an end.
35
   
But, is the EU doctrine really different? Some opinions seem to indicate otherwise by 
making a distinction between intermediate goals and ultimate goals. Consumer welfare is indeed 
the ultimate goal and implementing measures to protect effective competition could be seen as 
the instrumental intermediary into achieving it. Subsequently, consumer welfare becomes the 
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natural effect of the other goals pursued.
36
 The mechanism seems to work in the same way. The 
reasoning is based on the general perception that in an utopic ideal country, where 
anticompetitive behaviour is inexistent, all the consumers are happy.  
In the EU, emphases on the consumers as the centre of competition started at the same 
time with the reform of the competition policy towards a more economic approach.
37
 Since that 
moment the word “consumer” started to be the new trend, being mentioned quite often including 
in the Commission’s guidance paper on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty, according to which consumer harm is a criteria that needs to be fulfilled in order to 
prove an abusive practice. The CJEU itself also started displaying sympathy towards the new 
trend and in the Post Danmark case withheld that article 102 applies to conducts that hinder 
competition to the “detriment of the consumer”.38 
In Japan, besides the efficiency defence (the term “user” is used), mention of the 
consumer is rarely, if ever, seen. The EU term “consumer” includes besides final consumers also 
the customers on the intermediate markets
39
, category of enterprises that in Japan are directly 
protected by the unfair trade practices provision. In fact, judging by its structural build, most of 
the provisions in the AMA seemed to have been shaped so that to protect the smaller enterprises. 
Kobayashi Hideaki, the former Deputy Secretary-General of the Fair Trade Commission of 
Japan, is of the opinion that the provision is enforced in order to prevent “socially undesirable 
effects” rather than to protect the weak, because in any case when “the strong and the weak 
compete without any hindrance, the strong will become stronger”.40 Thus, it can be inferred that 
since anyway the weaker enterprise would lose, at least it should lose under fair conditions.  
The public interest is mentioned on a number of occasions in the AMA, however the 
meaning behind it bears no substantial importance. The Supreme Court, in the Oil Cartel Price 
Fixing Case asserted that the term has no separate meaning from “substantial restraint of 
competition”; the practices substantially restraining competition are considered per se contrary to 
the public interest and thus public interest within the meaning of the AMA should be understood 
as competition as such, except in exceptional situations when an agreement has sufficient 
redeeming advantages to become lawful.
41
   
Although, the competition policies of the two jurisdictions have experienced a somewhat 
different historical evolution, the basic philosophy, protection of the consumer, remains the same 
despite the different implementation approaches.  
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III.2 Enterprise vs undertaking 
 
The prohibitions included in articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU are directed towards 
“undertakings”, while the AMA chose the term “enterprise” (original term is 事業者 - jigyousha) 
in order to nominate entities that could become culprits by infringing its provisions.  
The TFEU does not give any indication towards what characteristics define an 
undertaking; however the issue has been tackled with by CJEU in a number of cases. An 
undertaking is considered any “entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal 
status or the way in which it is financed”.42 Furthermore according to the case law an economic 
activity implies the existence of two elements: a) the offering of goods and services on the 
market
43
, and b) if the activity could be carried out by an undertaking in the pursuit of profits.
44
  
In Japan, the term enterprise is defined in article 2(1) of the AMA as being any person 
who operates a commercial, industrial, financial or other business. Considering that business is 
understood as the “action of offering benefit in return for benefit, repeatedly and continuously, 
regardless of the profit”45, the similarity with the EU concept of “economic activity” can be 
spotted. Actually, the Japanese term “jigyousha” by itself implies economic activity, as it 
contains the kanji 業 whose basic philosophy is business activity. The CJEU, in the case FENIN 
explained that the “supply” dimension (offering goods) is what deems an entity undertaking and 
not its purchasing dimension.
46
 In Japan, mere participation in a market by way of selling, 
buying or otherwise, done in a regular and continuous way, turns an entity into an enterprise
47
, 
thus although it is not clear, it seems that purchasing alone could be enough for the AMA 
prohibitions to be triggered.  
In both of the jurisdictions the legal status of the entity is not relevant for its classification, 
thus both undertakings and enterprises encompass liberal professions, educational institutions, 
trade associations, professional bodies, non-profit organizations like agricultural cooperatives 
etc.
48
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Public authorities, when engaged in economic activities and not acting within the 
exercise of their public power, should also consider the competition rules in both of the 
jurisdictions, as they are seen as undertakings or enterprises under the antitrust policies.
49
 
To conclude, despite small differences the terms undertaking and entity do follow the 
same reasoning, referring to entities or bodies engaged in business activities, and for the purpose 
of this paper they will be used interchangeable, without any difference in the meaning. 
 
III.3 Structure of the Antimonopoly Act 
 
The EU legislation regarding anticompetitive practices is concentrated into the two TFEU 
articles – article 101 and 102. Whereas article 101 is a downright ban on agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which affect 
trade between member states and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the internal market, article 102 prohibits abusive behaviour 
within the internal market by undertakings holding a dominant position.
50
 In other words article 
101 deals with cartels and horizontal and vertical agreements bilaterally employed by 
undertakings while 102 is concerned with unilateral exploitative and exclusionary abuses of 
dominant position by undertakings.  
The Japanese AMA has a different structure and it is centred on four pillars: 
a) Monopolization; 
b) Unreasonable Restraint of Trade;  
c) Unfair trade practices; 
d) Mergers and Stock Acquisitions.51 
The third pillar, unfair trade practices, includes also the provisions regarding superior 
bargaining position and is a competition concept unique to Japan. Its content overlaps often with 
the other fields like private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade. Over time it has 
gained a lot of criticisms from companies as well as from academics for its lack of legal certainty 
and ambiguity concerning the standards of an illegal conduct.
52
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III.3.1 Monopolization – monopolistic situations and private monopolization 
 
The provisions against monopolization are put forward by means of two concepts: private 
monopolization (defined in article 2(5), prohibited in article 3) and monopolistic situation 
(defined in article 2(7), dealt with in article 8-4).  
The control over monopolistic situations was introduced by the 1977 amendment and 
deals with circumstances where one entrepreneur or a small number of entrepreneurs are 
dominant in a certain field of business in which there is little or no competition or free 
competition is inhibited.
53
 
While in the EU it was stressed right from the start that being in a dominant position on a 
certain market is not a bad thing in itself and that market power in itself is not per se illegal, the 
Japanese control of monopolistic situations appears to be indicating otherwise. The provision 
considers the structure of the market without taking into account the behaviour of the 
entrepreneurs on such a market.  
As it is defined in article 2(7) of the AMA, a monopolistic situation entails the existence 
of two elements: (1) market structure, and (2) market performance.
54
 Structurally, to fall under 
this provision the aggregate total value of goods on a particular market (“field of business”) 
together with the value of goods having extremely similar function and utility (what in EU 
competition law would be considered substitutability of product) or the total value of services of 
the same description supplied in Japan in the previous year was over 100 billion yen and  
(i) one single enterprise has over one-half (50%) of the shares on that market, or two 
enterprises’ combined share exceeds three-fourths (75%) during the relevant period; 
(ii) market entry for new enterprises is extremely difficult due to conditions on the 
market.
55
  
The market structure element seems to be very similar to the EU antitrust conditions 
regarding dominant position. The field of business is a concept similar to the product market and 
according to the Commission’s guidance paper on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 
102 of the TFEU Treaty (“The Guidance Paper”), large market shares are indicative of a 
dominant position while other factors like trade barriers and countervailing buyer power must be 
also considered.  
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The market performance element is assessed based on the price dynamics, or lack of it for 
that matter, of that particular product or service on the market. The two conditions that need to 
be fulfilled are: 
(i) a remarkable increase or a slight decrease in price of the particular good or 
service over a considerable period of time, and 
(ii) the enterprise has either made a profit at a rate far exceeding the profit rate 
specified by the Cabinet Order or has achieved extremely high sales or incurred 
administration costs that are far exceeding normal standards.
56
 
If the JFTC establishes that a monopolistic situation exists, it has full power to order the 
enterprise to take action in order restore competition on the market. The measures, which include 
among others, partial transfer of business or assets, sale of shares, transfer of technology etc were 
rarely actually implemented as they are intended for deterrent purposes especially against 
concerted practices to increase prices.
57
 Despite the fact that the condition on the market of the 
enterprise involved is similar to a dominant position by EU law standards, the “control of 
structure” part has no equivalent in Europe. The Commission is not competent, nor has ever been, 
to initiate proceedings against undertakings with market power where evidence of an abuse 
cannot be identified, regardless of the price fluctuation on the market. The legislation is pretty 
unique to the Japanese island and is most probably a “legacy” of its historical economic practices.  
Private monopolization is the Japanese provision that is closest to the abuse of dominant 
position comprised in article 102 TFEU. Although the text of the provision does not explicitly 
require a dominant position as its EU counterpart emphasizes right from the onset, the conduct 
must however cause a “substantial restraint of competition” condition which entails a certain 
degree of market power.  The term private monopolization is defined in article 2(5) of the AMA 
as being a “business activity by means of which an enterprise, individually or by combination or 
conspiracy with other enterprises, excludes or controls the business activities of other enterprises 
thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any 
particular field of trade”.  If we were to split the definition into pieces following the EU model 
then the conditions that should be fulfilled in order for the prohibition to be activated are: 
a) undertaking -> enterprise; 
b) dominant position-> substantial restraint of competition in a particular field; 
c) exclusionary abuse-> business conduct that excludes the business activity of other 
enterprises, or exploitative abuse -> business conduct that controls the business 
activities of other companies. 
When investigating whether a certain enterprise has engaged in private monopolization 
practices, the JFTC follows a different approach from the Commission. While the EU way is to 
first observe dominance and afterwards move onto the existence of abuse, when pursuing a case 
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of private monopolization first it is necessary to establish that an exclusionary conduct took place. 
The second step is to analyze if the particular behaviour can be deemed as a conduct 
substantially restraining competition in particular field.
58
 The guidelines make it clear that 
private monopolization does not exist unless both of the two conditions can be found to exist at 
once. However, in case it cannot be proved that a substantial restraint of competition on a 
particular field did occur, the conduct is still likely to fall under the prohibitions regulated in the 
article 2(9) of the AMA as an unfair trade practice.
59
   
What is common in both jurisdictions is the meaning of the terms “exclusionary” and 
“exploitative”/“conduct that controls the business of other enterprises”. Exclusionary conduct 
refers to practices that prevent competition on the market by excluding the business activity of 
other players on the market
60
, while exploitative implies taking advantage of the market power to 
exploit other undertakings or exerting power over weaker enterprises in order to direct, prohibit 
or restrict their activity.
61
 
In EU exclusionary abuse of dominant position can be any practice that “is likely to 
affect the structure of the market where, as a direct result of the presence of the undertaking in 
question, competition has already been weakened and which, through recourse to methods 
different from those governing normal competition in products or services based on traders’ 
performance, have the effect of hindering the maintenance or development of the level of 
competition still existing on the market”.62 The Japanese approach towards exclusionary conduct 
is somewhat simpler compared to its European counterpart including various conducts that 
would cause difficulty for other entrepreneurs to continue their business activities or for new 
market entrants to commence their business activities.
63
 However, in both jurisdictions the 
definitions are hardly used for identifying the prohibited conduct and the focus of the analysis is 
heavily centred on the foreclosure effects of the conduct.
64
 The JFTC guidelines, much like the 
Commission’s guidelines offer a non-exhaustive list of practices that could fall under the 
prohibition, indicating for each of them the tests that are to be applied and the factors that should 
be considered when there’s suspicious that such conduct might exist. The types of conduct 
covered by the JFTC guidelines are: 
1) Below-cost Pricing – practice similar to the EU predatory pricing; the test is roughly 
the same – profit sacrifice test – and the variables taken into account are the costs; 
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2) Exclusive dealing, including exclusive rebates - giving, concepts similar with the EU 
exclusive dealing and conditional rebates; 
3) Tying – similar to the EU tying and bundling practices; 
4) Refusal to supply and discriminatory treatment – similar to the EU refusal to supply. 
The conduct of the undertaking does not have to completely eliminate competition or 
actually block the business activity of competitors. In both jurisdictions the likelihood that 
foreclosure is the natural effect of the practice is enough for the conduct to fall under the 
prohibition.
65
 The only difference worth mentioning is that the JFTC guidelines require that it 
must be “highly likely” that the behaviour would cause difficulties for other enterprises to 
conduct their business.
66
 Exclusionary intent is also not a requirement according to the JFTC 
guidelines; however where intent is established then it becomes a factor likely to influence the 
presumption that the alleged conduct is exclusionary in character.
67
 Similarly, in the EU the 
exclusionary objective does not need to be proved as it is enough if the said conduct has the 
ability to exclude competition
68
, but if it turns out that the conduct was meant to have an anti-
competitive result then it can be considered that the conduct is liable to achieve that result.
69
 
The analysis of the exploitative abuse of dominant position/ “private monopolization by 
control” as well as the comparison between the concepts of dominant position and substantial 
restraint of trade are issues that are going to be dealt with in great depth within the next chapter. 
 
III.3.2 Unreasonable Restraint of Trade – Cartels and horizontal agreements 
The Japanese provision dealing with anticompetitive agreements is known under the 
name “unreasonable restraint of trade”. According to article 3, unreasonable restraints of trade 
are prohibited, and in the event of any infringement the JFTC issues a cease and desist order to 
ensure a halt of the anticompetitive practice. Similar to the competences of the Commission
70
, 
the JFTC is entitled also to impose structural and behavioural remedies, like the transfer of a part 
of the business, and financial penalties –surcharges- of up to 10% from the turnover registered in 
the previous year.
71
 Criminal penalties (imprisonment with work for not more than five years or 
a fine of not more than five million yen) can also be imposed on enterprises engaged in the 
forbidden practices.
72
 
                                                          
65
 Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin, Idem 60, p. 380 quoting the Discussion paper 
66
The Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act, Idem 58, p. 5 
67
The Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act, Idem 58, p. 4 
68
 Case 301/04, Clearstream Banking v. Commission[2009], ECLI:EU:T:2009:317, para. 142-144 
69
 Case T-203/01, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission [2003], ECLI:EU:T:2003:250, 
para. 241 
70
 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, art. 7 and art.23 
71
 The Anti Monopoly Act, art. 7 and 7-2 (Chapter II)  
72
 The Anti Monopoly Act, art. 92 
Page 24 out of 57 
 
Unreasonable restraints of trade are “business activities, by which any enterprise, by 
contract, agreement or any other means irrespective of its name, in concert with other enterprises, 
mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in such a manner as to fix, maintain or 
increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities or counterparties, thereby 
causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular 
field of trade”.73 The EU counterpart included in article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between member states and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. By analysing the concepts in 
parallel, it can be observed that a practice can trigger the two prohibitions when the following 
criteria are checked: 
a) Undertaking/enterprise; 
b) Agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices/ 
concerted activities by means of contract, agreement or other form of understanding; 
c) Agreement which has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition/ conduct that restricts business activities or fixes prices, 
limits production or other terms of business and which causes a substantial restraint 
of competition. 
The Japanese law does not make a difference between agreements and concerted 
practices. The prohibited act is called concerted activity, whereas a contract or agreement is just 
the projection of the practice into reality, but does not bear any importance to the classification 
of the conduct. The European model is not very different, as concerted practices are considered 
the forms of collusion that fall short of an agreement
74
; however even though a concerted 
practice is subjected to the same prohibition as if an agreement was concluded, the standard of 
proof is different. In order for a concerted practice to fall under the article 101(1) umbrella 
subsequent implementation on the market is required, whereas an agreement is by itself a 
consensual act.
75
 On the other hand, the Japanese provision requires a “substantial restraint of 
trade” making the JFTC competent to act only after the first step into the implementation of the 
conduct took place.
76
 
In order to prove collusion, the Commission needs to establish that a “concurrence of 
wills between economic operators on the implementation of a policy, the pursuit of an objective, 
or the adoption of a given line of conduct on the market”77 has occurred. The Japanese law 
requires a similar concept - mutual consent achieved by proof of communication of intent. In 
Yuasa Mokuzai, a case concerning bid rigging, in which all the tenderers after finding out the 
intended price of one of the participants colluded to adopt the same practice, the JFTC asserted 
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that conformity in conduct and results is not enough to establish a communication of intent. 
However, the existence of a reference price by which all the tenderers abided, followed by 
parallel conduct could suggest a mutual consent. 
78
 Thus, the correct formula in order to prove 
the existence of collusion is communication of intent followed by uniformity of conduct on the 
market.
79
 
Perhaps the biggest difference between article 101(1) TFEU and its Japanese counterpart 
is the fact that the latter does not cover vertical agreements. In the Consten&Grunding case the 
CJEU made it clear that the prohibition renders any anticompetitive agreement illegal, regardless 
of whether it was concluded between competitors or between undertakings operating at different 
levels of the market, and that there is nothing within the wording of article 101(1) to suggest 
otherwise.
80
 The text of the AMA however contains the words “mutual restriction” (相互制限- 
sougo seigen) which is interpreted as meaning that all colluding enterprises need to adhere to the 
same restriction in order for the prohibition to be triggered. While initially the JFTC applied the 
provision to both horizontal and vertical agreements, that practice changed in 1953 with the 
decision of the Tokyo High Court in the Newspaper Distribution case (新聞販路協定事件 – 
shinbun hanro kyoutei jiken).
81
 The case concerned 5 newspaper companies which concluded 
vertical agreements with a number of distributors.  By means of the agreements, each retailer 
was offered exclusivity to sell in a particular area, thus resulting into a partitioning of the market 
among the distributors.  The Tokyo High Court held that the territorial restriction was imposed 
only onto one party of the agreement while a similar restriction onto the newspaper companies 
was inexistent. As a result, the requirement “mutual restriction” was not satisfied so vertical 
agreements cannot be considered concerted activities. 
82
  
While the EU competition prohibition covers agreements that have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, the AMA took a different approach 
by providing a list of the types of practices which when causing a “substantial restraint of 
competition” become illegal. Among the factors that the JFTC takes into consideration when 
establishing substantial restraint of competition are the market shares of the enterprises, the 
conditions of competition in the market, the conditions of the competitors, the degree of entry 
barriers in practice etc
83
 so it would be reasonable to assume that the Japanese approach is more 
similar to the EU effects analysis.  
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Similar to the article 101(3) TFEU, enterprises in Japan can make use of an efficiency 
defence. The defence is included among the factors that are considered when establishing 
substantial restraint of competition, so unlike its EU counterpart, which is considered an 
exemption for an agreement deemed already to be infringing the main prohibition, the Japanese 
defence functions as a “rule of reason”. The criteria that need to be cumulatively fulfilled are 
roughly similar: 
a) improvement of productivity, technological innovation, and the improvement of the 
efficiency of business activities / efficiencies; 
b) outcomes are returned to users and the welfare of users is improved/allowing 
consumers a fair share of the benefits; 
c) specific to the conduct and it cannot be achieved by other means that are less 
restrictive on competition/indispensable. 
84
 
 
III.3.3 Unfair Trade Practices 
It was mentioned previously that unlike its EU counterpart the unreasonable restraint of 
trade prohibition does not cover vertical agreements. Anticompetitive behaviour involving 
undertakings operating at different levels of the market are covered by the unfair trade practices 
provision, and of course when the behaviour is deemed as substantially restricting competition it 
would become an act of private monopolization (abuse of dominant position by EU standards).  
The importance of the difference lies in the fact that the unfair trade practices are considered 
unilateral conducts and subsequently in the event such a practice arises the JFTC can impose 
surcharges only on the enterprise “employing” the practice, despite the fact that the practice 
might be collusive in character.
85
 
While in the EU these type of practices trigger the prohibition under article 102 TFEU 
only when they are employed by undertakings designated as dominant, in Japan the enterprise 
does not have to be dominant, albeit in some cases where a certain degree of superior bargaining 
power is required. Furthermore the conduct does not have to actually prevent competition. If it 
can be proved that it has a tendency to impede competition then the unfair trade practice label 
can be stuck on it.
86
    
The unfair trade practices prohibited by article 19 of the AMA are: 
 refusal to trade – collective and individual; 
 discriminatory pricing/treatment; 
 unjust low price sales; 
 unjust high price purchasing; 
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 resale price restriction; 
 deceptive customer inducement 
 customer inducement by unjust benefits 
 tie-in sales; 
 trade on exclusive terms or other restrictive terms; 
 abuse of superior bargaining position; 
 interference with competitors’ transactions; 
 interference with internal operations of competitors.87 
Applying the unfair trade practices clause instead of private monopolization is often more 
convenient since the burden of proof is much lighter, market power does not need to be 
established, and in any event in both situations the JFTC has the discretion to levy surcharges as 
penalties.
88
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Chapter IV Abuse of dominant position – exploitative abuses 
 
IV.1 Exploitative Abuse of dominant position vs Private monopolization by 
control and exploitative unfair trade practices 
 
As previously stated, while in EU law the exploitative abuses of dominant position are 
covered by the prohibition included in article 102 TFEU, the Japanese AMA has two provisions 
designed, among others, to offer protection against such practices. When a particular abusive 
practice substantially restricts competition then the prohibition under the Private Monopolization 
clause (defined in article 2(5), prohibited in article 3) is triggered. However, if the practice does 
not substantially restrict competition, but it does have a “tendency to impede competition” it can 
still be prohibited under the unfair trade practices clause (defined in article 2(9), prohibited in 
article 19), despite the fact that the abusive enterprise might lack market power.  
In order for the prohibitions against exploitative abuses included in article 102 TFEU and 
in the article 3 and 19 of the AMA to be applicable to a particular conduct the following 
conditions must be fulfilled:   
a) undertaking/enterprise; 
b) dominant position/substantial restraint of trade in a particular field of trade or 
tendency to impede competition; 
c) exploitative abuse/business conduct that controls the business activities of other 
companies or one of the exploitative conducts under the unfair trade practices 
clause. 
IV.1.1 Dominant position vs. substantial restraint of competition in a particular field of 
trade/tendency to impede competition 
In EU law establishing dominant position is one of the main keys into determining 
whether a certain practice falls under the 102 prohibition. Similarly, the Japanese Private 
Monopolization provision requires that the abusive conduct be characterized by a “substantial 
restraint of competition”, which like the concept of dominant position implies inter alia a certain 
degree of market power. 
From the get go it is necessary to observe that while dominant position is a prerequisite 
condition for the abuse, substantial restraint of competition is an effect of such a conduct. 
Therefore, although there is no need for the undertaking to make use of its powerful position on 
the market while employed in the abusive practice
89
, nonetheless the undertaking must hold the 
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dominant position prior to the abuse and not as a result of it.
90
 On the other hand, the substantial 
restraint of competition is the result of the abusive conduct of the undertaking on the market 
(“thereby causing”). The Japanese private monopolization clause is not concerned with the 
condition on the market of the enterprise prior to the moment where it engaged in excluding or 
controlling the business activity of other enterprises.
91
 Subsequently, when analyzing an act of 
private monopolization, the JFTC first seeks to prove the existence of the abusive practice, by 
exclusion or control, and afterwards determines whether the said practice substantially restraints 
competition.
92
 
The concept of dominant position was first defined by the CJEU in the United Brands 
case and only a year later the definition has been further elaborated in the Hoffmann-La Roche 
case. Ever since then both the CJEU and the Commission have been consistent in maintaining 
the same meaning behind the concept and the definition was also included in the Guidance Paper. 
Thus, dominance is considered a “position of economic strengths enjoyed by an undertaking, 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on a relevant market, by 
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its 
customers and ultimately of consumers”.93 
In Japan, the Supreme Court of Japan, in the 1954 Touhou-Shintouhou case (東宝-新東
宝事件), shaped the first definition of substantial restraint of competition as being the ability of 
one or a group of enterprises to “determine prices and other terms of business independent of 
market forces”.94  In 2009, in an appeal trial seeking to revoke the JFTC’s decision in the NTT 
East case (NTT東日本事件- NTT Higashi Nihon jiken), the Tokyo High Court, based on the 
previous definition, expended the contour of the concept and provided a wider range of 
parameters that should be considered together during the analysis. The new definition has been 
also adopted by the JFTC in the Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the 
Antimonopoly Act and holds substantial restraint of competition to mean “establishing, 
maintaining, or strengthening the state in which a certain entrepreneur or a certain group of 
entrepreneurs can control the market at will by being, to some extent, free to influence the price, 
quality, quantity, and other various conditions after competition itself has lessened”.95  
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Although phrased differently, the two definitions are focused around the same issues; 
both of them refer to the condition on the market of an undertaking, condition which is powerful 
enough to allow it to act somewhat freely (“independently/at will”) of any competitive pressure 
on a particular market/field of trade. The only difference lies in the fact that in the EU law, the 
powerful condition of the entity on the market endows the undertaking with the ability to prevent 
competition; however actual harmful effects on competition are not required when establishing 
dominance, evidence of a hypothetical and abstract ability is enough. In contrast, the Japanese 
provision does imply a certain degree of negative influence on the level of competition in a 
particular field (“competition itself has lessened”). This condition does not come as a surprise 
when considering the cause-effect relationship between the abusive conduct and the economic 
power of the enterprise that distinguishes the Japanese provision from its European counterpart. 
  It can be observed from the phrasing of the Private Monopolization clause itself (article 
2(5) of the AMA) that the substantial restraint of competition must manifest itself “in a particular 
field”. Likewise, in EU, although the prohibition included in article 102 TFEU does not 
expressly state it, the dominant position can exist only in relation to a relevant market.  As a 
result, indentifying the relevant market is of paramount significance to determining whether an 
entity is dominant or not.
96
 Both the Commission and the JFTC apply a two-fold test when 
establishing dominance and substantial restraint of competition: first defining the relevant 
market/ field of trade and afterwards assessing the position of the entity on the said market and 
the possible competitive repressions it faces. 
Field of trade and relevant market are synonym concepts. The defining process is 
designed in the same manner and both of the concepts entail two dimensions: 
a) product market/scope of products; 
b) geographical market/geographical scope.97 
Scope of products, similarly to the product market, refers to all the products that are to a 
certain degree substitutable from the viewpoint of the users. In both jurisdiction substitutability is 
primarily analyzed by looking at the demand substitutability, notion that in the Japanese antitrust 
law is known as the degree of similarity of a product’s utility for users. Additionally, both the 
Commission and the JFTC can also take into account the capacity of the manufacturer to switch 
from the production and sale of a certain good to another in a short period of time without 
incurring considerable extra costs (supply substitutability). 
98
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In EU law the cross-elasticity of demand is judged based on the products characteristics, 
their prices and intended use. Another tool used quite often by the Commission is the SSNIP (a 
small but non-transitory increase in prices) test.
99
 According to the Guidelines for Exclusionary 
Private Monopolization, the criteria JFTC has to consider are: 
a) usage – the characteristics of the products (external features, material characteristics, 
quality, technological characteristics) and its different usages; 
b) changes in price, quantity etc – the JFTC adopts an approach similar to the EU SSNIP 
test, by considering products X and Y substitutable when in case of a price raise of X, 
the sales volume of Y or the price of Y increase also. However, two products could be 
found to belong to two different markets due to the fact that users rarely choose one 
over the other because of the price difference between the two. Furthermore, two 
products are considered not to be interchangeable when despite having equal prices, the 
users would be charged additional costs in order to make the switch from one to another.     
c) recognition and behaviour of the users – the perception of the consumer is taken into 
account as well as the past behaviour of the consumer in case of a price increase 
(evidence of substitution in the past). 
100
  
In the United Brands case the CJEU has focused on the external characteristic – 
“appearance”- and on the material features – “taste, softness, lack of seeds, easy handling and 
non-seasonal production”- of bananas in order to distinguish it from other fruits. Bananas are 
fruits addressing any consumer, despite age, and unlike other fruits the production process is not 
influenced by seasons as it can be supplied all around the year. Additionally, the price of bananas 
is not influenced, except to an insignificant extent, by the prices of the other fruits. In the light of 
these arguments, the CJEU determined that bananas by themselves have a market separate from 
the other fruits.
101
 In the Michelin I case the CJEU considered the usages of the product and the 
particularly specialized distribution network that was required, in order to determine that the 
tyres for lorries and buses had their own single market.
102
 In Japan, the JFTC, during merger 
proceedings in the case Chuoseni-Teikoku Seima (中央繊維株式会社帝国製麻株式会社両社
合併), found that rope made of hemp yarn and rope made from chemical fibres belong to the 
same market due to its interchangeable use, and decided not to pursue proceedings against the 
merger any further. 
103
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The geographic market or the geographical scope is the territory in which competition 
takes place.
104
 The most significant factor that determines the geographical market is the real 
possibility of consumers to find a substitute product in a different area, in the light of the 
additional costs required, willingness of consumers to switch to products produced elsewhere, 
distribution channels etc.
105
 The business area of suppliers and area for the users to purchase, the 
characteristics of the product (if the product is perishable or fragile transportation over long 
distances might not be an option) and the means and costs of transportation are, according to the 
Guidelines, the circumstances considered by the JFTC when establishing the geographical scope. 
Once the relevant market/field of trade has been defined, the next step is to focus on the 
market position of the entity involved as well as to the constraints imposed by the said market on 
the undertaking. In doing so, both the Commission and the JFTC will take into account the 
following elements: 
a) market position of the alleged entity and of its competitors; 
b) barriers to expansion and entry/potential competitive pressure; 
c) countervailing buyer power/ countervailing bargaining power.106  
The Commission considers market shares, interpreted in the light of market conditions, 
as a first indicator of dominance while the Japanese guidelines deem an entity with large market 
shares as more likely to substantially restraint competition. If the abusive conduct is capable of 
manipulating the conditions of the market then competition is more likely to be inhibited by 
Japanese standards. Similarly, the guidelines point out that in an oligopolistic market, reigned by 
few leading entrepreneurs, the odds that competitive harm would occur are higher.
107
  
The Guidance Paper states that low market shares, below 40%, are not likely to bestow 
dominance on an undertaking while large market shares, held over some time, do set forward a 
presumption of dominance.
108
 The Japanese guidelines do not refer to any parameters regarding 
the market shares, but do however mention that the JFTC will pursue a private monopolization 
case when, once engaged in the prohibited conduct, the shares of the alleged enterprise exceed 
50%.
109
 50% seems to be the magic number in EU law also; in the Akzo case the CJEU held that 
when an enterprise owns half of the relevant market it is enough to precipitate a dominant 
position presumption. 
110
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When establishing the position on the market of the alleged enterprise, the JFTC takes 
into account also the effects the conduct has on the competitors. If the behaviour of the entity 
makes it difficult for the competitors to conduct their business activities freely then the behaviour 
can be most likely deemed as preventing competition. In EU law, since dominant position is not 
judged in the light of the abuse, the business conditions of the competitors are irrelevant; 
however their market shares when compared with the market shares of the alleged undertaking 
could influence the dominance diagnosis.
111
 In United Brands, the undertaking was found 
dominant because despite having a 45% market share, the percentage was twice as large as its 
next competitor. In the Michelin I case, Michelin had a market share of 57-65% and while that 
by itself was a strong token of dominance, the fact that the rest of the market was fragmented 
among competitors having around 4-8% shares each convinced the CJEU that Michelin was 
indeed dominant.
112
   
Potential expansion by competitors and potential entries by new competitors or 
potential competitive pressure, as the Japanese guidelines call it, is another element relevant for 
judging the existence of dominant position or substantial restraint of competition. In order to 
analyse the potential competitive pressure and assess whether entry on the market is feasible the 
JFTC takes a look at the degree of institutional entry barriers, the degree of entry barriers in 
practice and the degree of substitutability between the entrant’s and the entrepreneur’s products.  
Entry barriers, in both jurisdictions, refer to the same kind of circumstances which place an 
entrant in a disadvantageous position compared to the dominant undertaking. Among those 
circumstances worth mentioning are financial resources, superior technology, established sales 
and distribution systems, access to raw materials and key inputs etc.
113
 Moreover, the Japanese 
view is that when the degree of substitutability between the entrant’s and the entrepreneur’s 
products is high, the users might find themselves reluctant to buy the entrant’s product instead of 
a product they are familiar with, situation in which the competitive pressure of the market does 
not work efficiently.
114
  
Competitive restraints could be imposed also by customers having enough bargaining 
strength over the alleged dominant undertaking so that not to allow it to behave independently 
and to freely influence prices or other conditions on the market. Consequently when the 
countervailing buyer/bargaining power has a sufficient impact on the entity’s business activity 
then it is unlikely that competition would be substantially restraint or that the undertaking is 
dominant. Both the JFTC and the Commission asses countervailing buyer power in the light of 
the customer’s size, its ability to easily switch suppliers or to pose a real threat that it will, its 
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ability to promote new entry and to maintain the level of the prices on the market.
115
 Moreover, 
if the bargaining power is strong enough to the level at which it could be abused, then the roles 
could be reversed and the retailer can become an infringer under the unfair trade practices clause 
of the AMA. 
As previously stated when assessing if competition has been substantially restraint the 
JFTC looks at the circumstances of the case occurring after the abuse has been committed or at 
least when the abuse is in its first stage of completion. As a result, the exemption defences are 
included also under the substantial restraint of competition analysis. On the other hand, in EU 
law, the exemption are analysed under the abuse element of the prohibition. The Japanese 
guidelines, similarly to the Guidance Paper, put forward two types of defences: 
a) Extraordinary circumstances to assure consumer interests – the equivalent of the 
objective necessity defence that justifies the conduct on grounds like interest of the consumer 
and public health and safety. The Japanese guidelines add development of national economy to 
the list by pointing out that when the conduct pursuits such a goal it is not seen as substantially 
restricting competition. 
b) Efficiencies - in both jurisdictions for this defence to be effective the efficiencies must be 
specific to or a result of the prohibited conduct and should not be possible to obtain them by 
less anti-competitive means. Additionally, while the Guidance Paper requires the efficiencies 
to outweigh the negative effects the conduct has on competition, the Japanese Guideline is not 
concerned with balancing the positive and negative outcomes. Rather, the influence of the 
positive effects on consumer welfare is assessed, and in case an improvement is brought about, 
the conduct is not considered to fulfil the substantial restraint of competition criteria.
116
  
 In EU, the 1983 Michelin I case gave birth to the so called special responsibility 
doctrine according to which dominant undertakings must make sure that their behaviour on the 
market does not distort genuine competition.
117
 In other words, practices in which non-dominant 
undertakings could engage without any legal repercussions may be prohibited for a dominant 
undertaking due to its powerful position on the market. In Japan, such a concept does not exist, 
and were it to exist would not serve its purpose since the market power of the enterprise is 
assessed as an aftermath of the abusive conduct. However, in reality an unofficial form of such a 
responsibility could be identified, but unlike in EU law, it applies to all enterprises regardless of 
their market power. The unfair trade practices prohibition is directed against any entity, in as far 
as their actions have a tendency to impede competition; therefore any undertaking, before 
engaging in business activities, must consider whether or not their conduct might be seen as an 
unfair practice.  
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The prohibition of unfair trade practices is seen as a first step into the fight against 
monopolization. If not regulated in their early stages these king of business dealings could confer 
the enterprise with enough market power to be able to pursue private monopolization. A 
particular conduct becomes an unfair trade practice when it has a tendency to impede 
competition, meaning that actual anticompetitive effects do not need to be observed, the 
likelihood that they might occur is enough to deem a practice unfair.
118
 Tendency to impede 
competition implies, according to some authors, either a “reduction of competition, competition 
by unjust means or infringing the bases of free competition”. The text of article 2 (9), which 
provides the description of unfair trade practices does not always use the structure “tendency to 
impede competition”, however it uses expressions like “unjustly” or “without justifiable grounds” 
which are meant to be interpreted in that manner.
119
 In EU law, such types of practices, that tend 
to prevent competition but which cannot be attributed to a dominant undertaking are not covered 
by any antitrust prohibitions. Many authors consider that they cross over the thresholds of 
competition law and protrude into the realm of tort law and subsequently no public authority 
should tackle them. 
120
 
The JFTC often initiates proceeding for unfair trade practice when it is difficult to prove 
that a specific conduct substantially restraints competition and thus a private monopolization 
case cannot be pursued. 
121
 That is what happened in the 2008 Microsoft case, in which the JFTC 
found Microsoft in violation of article 19 of the AMA (prohibition of unfair trade practices). 
Microsoft included in their licensing of Windows OS agreements a non-assertion clause, 
according to which the PC manufacturers were not allowed to sue Microsoft in case of any patent 
infringement related to audio visual technology. The JFTC identified the field of trade as being 
PC audio visual technology market (on which Microsoft was not dominant) and deemed the 
conduct to be trading on restrictive terms practices falling within section 13 (now 12) of the 
Designation of Unfair Trade Practices Notice.
122 The JFTC was criticized for choosing the easy 
way out and not applying the globally accepted private monopolization/abuse of dominant 
position provision. Many commentators consider that the field of trade could have been 
narrowed down further, for example to Windows OS related audio-visual technology, market on 
which Microsoft would hold without any doubt a powerful position.
123
 An alternative would 
have been applying the EU reasoning in the Tetra Pak II case, where the Commission found that 
the undertaking abused its dominant position on the aseptic carton market by its behaviour on the 
                                                          
118
 Matsushita Mitsuo, idem 103, p.148 
119
 Matsumoto Taku, Nakano Yusuke, Chapter 6: Japan in Katrina Groshinski and Caitlin Davies, Competition Law 
in Asia Pacific: A Practical Guide, (Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International 2015) p. 351 - 403 
120
 Takigawa Yoshiaki, idem 88, p. 469 
121
 Matsumoto Taku, Nakano Yusuke, idem 119 
122
 Hearing Decision against Microsoft Corporation, Japan Fair Trade Commission (マイクロソフトコーポレーシ
ョンに対する審判審決について), September 2008 
123
 Takigawa Yoshiaki, A comparative analysis of U.S., EU, and Japanese Microsoft cases: How to regulate 
exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm in a network industry, The Antitrust Bulletin: Vol. 50, No. 2/Summer 2005, 
p. 236-265, p. 263 
Page 36 out of 57 
 
non-aseptic carton market on which it was not dominant.
124
 Similarly Microsoft could have been 
found that it leveraged its powerful position from the PC operating systems market to gain 
advantages on the audio visual technology market.    
IV.1.2 2 Abusive practices: exploitative abuses vs controlling conduct/ exploitative 
unfair trade practices  
After the prohibition on abuse of dominant position was first implemented in the EU the 
general perception was that the provision was meant to be enforced only against the exploitative 
types of conduct. The work of the Commission and the jurisprudence of the CJEU were also 
consistent in that view. That mentality was dispersed by the CJEU judgement in the 1973 
Continental Can case, which affirmed the double role of the provision as being challenging the 
legality of both exploitative and exclusionary conducts. The year 1973 is a milestone in the 
history of EU competition law because it marks the beginning of the three decades long saga of 
the Commission’s fight against exclusionary abuses as well as the beginning of the veil of 
ignorance regarding the exploitative practices.
125
 
  In what it concerns the private monopolization clause of the AMA there was never any 
doubt about the types of conduct it prohibited. The provision stated from the very beginning that 
it refers to both conducts that exclude as well as to conducts that control the business activities of 
other enterprises. However, the implementation of the provision against exploitative behaviour 
saw the same fate as its European counterpart; the provision has hardly ever been applied in 
relation to private monopolization practices by control.
126
 That is partly because most of the 
cases have been qualified as unfair trade practices, under which, as stated previously the JFTC 
has only to prove a tendency to impede competition.  
Private monopolization by control is not defined in the AMA, and unlike the exclusionary 
conducts, the JFTC has never published guidelines regarding its application. The concept of 
control has been however defined in 1957 by the Tokyo High Court in the Noda Soy-Sauce case 
(野田醤油事件- Noda shouyu jiken) as being the act of “taking away from other entrepreneurs 
their free decision in business activities and such an act must be distinguishable from those 
normal means of competition in a market”.127 Thus, control entails imposing the intention of the 
controlling enterprise on another entity by depriving it of the freedom to make decisions 
regarding its business activities. 
128
 In EU, in the United Brands case, the CJEU stated that an 
undertaking abuses its dominant position in an exploitative manner when it makes use “of the 
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opportunities arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which 
it would not have reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective competition”.129 
Exploitative abuses are meant to cause harm directly to the consumers and provide an advantage 
to the dominant undertaking.
130
 While the criteria in case of the private monopolization by 
control can be easily identified – competition must be substantially restraint by manipulating the 
business activities of another enterprise -, the same cannot be sad about its EU counterpart. There 
are no clear parameters in EU law when considering exploitative abuses, however the general 
opinion is that their main characteristic is the direct harm to customers
131
, which is not different 
from the Japanese approach where the enterprise being controlled is in fact a customer of the 
controlling enterprise.    
Private monopolization, unlike abuse of dominant position, can be achieved by two types 
of conducts: direct control and indirect control. Direct control means any sort of behaviour by 
which the dominant enterprise exerts its power straight on the controlled entity. The issue of 
indirect control was first introduced by the Tokyo High Court in the Noda Soy-Sauce case. In the 
1950
th
 in Japan the soy sauce market was highly oligopolistic; only four companies were 
supplying soy sauce at a national scale, among which Noda was the leading player with a market 
share of 37% in Tokyo (geographical market established by the JFTC). Noda engaged in resale 
price maintenance and by different tactics managed to determine its retailers to raise the prices of 
soy sauce to a certain suggested level. Subsequently, the other three major companies on the 
market adopted the same behaviour and their retail price for soy sauce was raised as the same 
level as the one practiced by Noda’s retailers. The JFTC considered that due to the peculiar build 
of the market Noda was capable to manipulate and indirectly control the price policies of the 
other companies. The conduct amounted to private monopolization by indirect control. The 
Tokyo High Court upheld the decision explaining that there is no indication in the definition 
offered by article 2(5) of the AMA that indirect control was excluded. The decision was highly 
criticized, mainly due to the wide spectrum that the concept of control seems to cover.
132
 
Needless to say, to the day the JFTC has never initiated a similar investigation. In EU, the 
behaviour of the soy sauce producers would be considered mere tacit collusion and the 
Commission would not have competence to interfere in the matter.  
The unfair trade practices are listed and defined by the JFTC in the Designation of Unfair 
Trade Practices Notice. Identifying them seems like an easy job for the JFTC. As long as they 
can be found on the list and they pose even the slightest threat that as a result competition might 
be inhibited, proceedings against them can be initiated. Among the unfair trade practices, the 
ones exploitative in character are: discriminatory consideration, discriminatory treatment on 
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trade terms, unjust high price purchasing, resale price restriction, deceptive customer inducement, 
customer inducement by unjust benefits, tying, trade on exclusive terms or other restrictive terms, 
abuse of superior bargaining position, interference with competitors’ transactions and 
interference with internal operations of competitors. As it can be observed, some of them like 
interference with a competitor’s transactions or their internal operations belong to the private 
area, which in Europe the Commission would probably never touch. 
The discriminatory practices can be identified in the Designation of Unfair Trade 
Practices Notice under two forms: discriminatory consideration (price discrimination) and 
discriminatory treatment on trade terms. In EU law they are included in article 102 (c) TFEU – 
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions. In both jurisdictions the simple fact of 
applying different prices is not in itself unlawful, but when it is used to inhibit competition 
(indicated by the word “unjustly” in the AMA) or to cause a “competitive disadvantage” the 
thresholds of legality are passed.  
In the Asahi Breweries case (アサヒビール会社) , the JFTC found that Asahi’s conduct, 
discriminatorily reimbursing the costs of sales promotion only for particular distributors from the 
south part of Osaka Prefecture, to amount to discriminatory treatment in as far as competition 
between retailers was affected in a negative manner.
133
 In United Brands and Tetra Pak II the 
CJEU accepted the premises that different prices can be justified by objective market conditions, 
however in these two cases the situation was found to have occurred due to the desire of the 
entities to partition the market rather than due to external conditions. Moreover, in Tetra Pak II 
the General Court ascertained that by applying lower prices in Italy the practice was in fact 
designed to preclude competition.
134
 Similarly, in the British Sugar case, the aim of the 
discriminatory price between the customers buying sugar in bulk and the ones buying packaged 
sugar was to drive out competitors from the market.
135
 The JFTC dealt with a related issue in the 
1967 Hokkoku Shinbun case (北国新聞事件), in which an undertaking wishing to increase its 
market shares in a particular area sold  its newspaper for a price lower than in another area where 
it already held market power. 
136
 
Article 102(c) TFEU states that discrimination can occur only in cases involving 
equivalent transactions, which according to the case law (cases T-289/11 Deutsche Bahn, C-
266/96 Corsica Ferries) can be judged based on the total sales, costs incurred for transporting, 
storing, servicing, for promotional activities etc.
137
 Similarly, the JFTC in the Nippon Oil case 
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( 新日本石油株式会社 - Shin Nihon Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha), took into account the 
dissimilarities in the content and the conditions of the transactions, as well as the differences in 
the size of the purchases and ruled that Nippon Oil was not involved in discriminatory 
consideration. Nippon Oil was suspected of selling gasoline to the entities issuing the so-called 
Pricing Cards (like affiliates of car leasing undertakings) at prices considerably lower than the 
ones applied to its other customers.
138
   
Trading on restrictive terms refers to situations when an enterprise is “trading with 
another party on conditions which unjustly restrict any trade between the said party and its other 
transacting party or other business activities of the said party”.139 Perhaps the most famous case 
involving trading on restrictive terms is the previously mentioned Microsoft case. During the 
negotiations for the conclusion of Windows licensing agreements, the manufacturers and sellers 
of PCs were compelled by Microsoft to accept a non-assertion provision according to which, 
they were not allowed to initiate litigations against neither Microsoft nor its subsidiaries in case 
of an infringement of their patent rights related to audio visual technology. The JFTC concluded 
that even though there was no sufficient evidence in the case that the competitive environment 
has been harmed, the conduct did inhibit the incentive of the PC manufacturers to invest in 
research and development and amounted to an unfair trade practice.
140
  In EU these types of 
practices are known as unfair trading conditions. The matter was brought up in the case BRT v. 
SABAM, in which a dominant undertaking, specialized in the management of copyrights, 
required its authors to assign both past and present rights and in case of the withdrawal of a 
particular member, the undertaking would continue exercising his rights for a period of 5 years 
afterwards. The CJEU found the conduct to be an abuse within the meaning of article 102, in as 
much as it goes beyond what is absolutely necessary in order to achieve the object of the 
agreement.
141
 
A private monopolization by control case involving restrictive conditions was the 1972 
Toyo-Seikan case (東洋製罐事件). Toyo-Seikan, a tin-manufacturing enterprise was holding 
29% of the shares of Hokkai-Seikan, another tin-producing company. In order to limit the market 
of Hokkai to the Hokkaido Prefecture, Toyo-Seikan imposed a series of restrictions on its 
activity. Moreover, Hokkai was allowed to build a plant on the mainland, in the Saitama 
Prefecture, only after accepting certain conditions regarding the type of cans that were to be 
produced and sold. The JFTC found these actions to be unlawful, issued a cease and desist order 
and ordered Toyo-Seikan to dispose of the Hokkai shares it owned.
142
 In the Tetra Pak II case 
the General Court found the clauses involving exclusive rights to maintain and fix the equipment, 
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exclusive rights to supply spare parts, prior consent from Tetra Pak before selling or transferring 
the use of the equipment, notifications in case of any improvement or modifications etc, to be 
abusive in character in the light of article 102 TFEU.
143
                  
Fox Japan, a film distributor, was also found in breach of article 19 AMA by compelling 
theatres to apply the indicated admission fee to its movies and implementing a prior 
authorization of discounts system.
144
 Likewise, prohibiting retailers from disclosing into their 
advertisements the price of the product (in this case contact lenses)
145
, as well as forcing the 
retailers to display in the shop and on leaflets a reference price for their products (mobile 
phones)
146
 were found by the JFTC to be restrictive practices. In the Alsatel v SA Novasam the 
CJEU considered the unilateral conduct of the dominant undertaking to determine the prices of 
the supplements to the contract as well as the automatic renewal of the contract for another 15 
years when certain conditions are fulfilled to amount to unfair trading conditions.
147
 
In EU, according to article 102(a) TFEU the dominant position can be also abused by 
imposing unfair prices. An unfair price is usually understood as being an excessive price, and 
the Commission has been using a set of cost parameters in order to determine at which level a 
certain price becomes excessive and subsequently unlawful. In General Motors the CJEU said 
that excessiveness is judged in relation to the economic value of the product or of the service. 
148
 
In United Brands the CJEU dismissed the Commission’s allegation that the company was 
engaged in unfair price practices due to lack of evidence, however it reiterated that adopting an 
incredibly high price that cannot be reasonably explained by the economic value of the product is 
an abusive conduct within the meaning of article 102 TFEU.
149
 In what way the economic value 
of a product can be quantified remains a mystery, as the Court did not seem willing to detail on 
the subject. The Japanese AMA, under unfair trade practices, covers only the unjust price 
purchasing, referring only to the act of buying products or services for a high consideration and 
not to the act of selling for a high price.
150
 Excessive pricing could still fall under the private 
monopolization prohibition, however no such case has been recorded so far. 
Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations is also prohibited under article 102(d) TFEU. The practice is known 
as tying and has gained a lot of attention due to its capacity of eliminating competition and being 
treated by the Commission as an exclusionary abuse. However, the practice is exploitative by 
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nature, matter emphasized by the General Court in the Microsoft case, where supplying the 
Windows OS with Windows Media Player pre-installed was deemed as “coercion”.151 In Hilti 
the conduct was seen by the Commission as limiting the consumer choice in what it concerned 
the type of nails that could be purchased and thus resulting in exploitation.
152
 In Japan, in the 
1965 Textbook case, a textbook wholesaler, and the only textbook supplier in the Nagano 
Prefecture, coerced its retailers to acquire also normal books to the value of two-thirds of the 
value of textbooks they purchased.
153
 In a more recent case, in 2004 Canon was investigated by 
the JFTC for tie-in unfair trade practices by manufacturing its printers so that they wouldn’t 
work with recycled cartridges produced by other undertakings.
154
     
The AMA, under unfair trade practices, also prohibits the interference with a 
competitor’s transaction, referring to situations in which an undertaking precludes one of its 
competitors from entering a contract or from benefiting from the effects of a contract concluded 
with a third party. The provision is pretty unique to Japanese competition law and it does not 
have an equivalent in EU law. In 2003, the JFTC issued a recommendation to Yonex, a 
manufacturer of sports equipment, who was considered to be hampering with the business 
activity of its competitors (others companies selling or importing shuttlecocks) and their 
customers. Yonex was urging all of its retailers, as well as the organizers of badminton 
competitions, to abstain from selling or using shuttlecocks distributed by other enterprises. The 
pressure was backed by the threat that Yonex would otherwise cease supplying its own 
shuttlecocks.
155
A similar situation was in the United Brands case, where the dominant 
undertaking stopped supplying its brand of bananas to a Danish retailer who was involved in an 
advertisement campaign for the bananas of a competing supplier. However, United Brands did 
not threaten but actually discontinued its supply, so the case was treated by the Commission as a 
refusal to supply type of conduct.
156
 
Another recommendation was issued by the JFTC against Daiichikosho Ltd (第一興商株
式会社) a company specialized in the selling and renting of karaoke machines, for determining 
two companies that managed the music of such karaoke machines not to offer their services for 
the machines produced by  a competitor.
157
 As it can be observed, the pressure is usually exerted 
by means of intermediates (retailers), by instructing them not to honour their obligations under 
the contract with the competitor. In a more recent case, DeNa, the operator of the “Mobage-
Town” mobile Social Networking Service (SNS) as well as a game developer, prevented other 
game developers from providing their games on the SNS platform of a competitor (“GREE”). 
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DeNa threatened that it would disconnect the games from its own SNS platform in case they 
would be made available on GREE.
158
 
Another provision which is unique to Japanese Competition law is the deceptive 
customer inducement, defined in article 8 of the Designation of Unfair Trade Practices Notice as 
being the “unjustly inducement of the customers of a competitor to trade with oneself by causing 
them to misunderstand that the substance of goods or services supplied by oneself, or its trade 
terms, or other matters relevant to such trade are much better or much more favorable than the 
actual ones or than those pertaining to the competitor”. In Europe such a situation would be a 
matter belonging exclusively to private law (contractual and tort law) and no public authority 
would have competence to get involved.  
The provision is supplemented by section 4, Prohibition of misleading representation, of 
the Act against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations
159
 and between 2003 
and 2008 the JFTC has investigated approximately 20 such cases.  The most common cases are 
the ones concerning misleading representation on quality (the “Lucky Wallet” case 160 , the 
electric scooters case
161
) and misleading representation on country of origin (the Tomorrowland 
Co. and World Co.case
162
, Daimatu Kogyo K.k case
163
 etc). 
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IV.2 Abuse of superior bargaining position vs abuse of dominant buyer power 
 
The Anti Monopoly Act prohibits also, as unfair trade practices, abuses by enterprises 
that hold a superior bargaining position. Many commentators consider that the provision was 
drafted more for the purpose of protecting small and medium-sized enterprises against the 
pressure exerted by companies that have an upper hand in negotiations, rather than for the 
purpose of combating anticompetitive behaviour.
164
 
Unlike the rest of the provisions comprised by the AMA the abuse of superior bargaining 
prohibition is directed against abuses performed from the downstream level of the market by 
retailers against companies in the upper level of the market (suppliers). The Guidelines 
Concerning Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position under the Antimonopoly Act asserts that the 
terms of the transactions between undertakings are left at the independent latitude of the parties. 
However, when an enterprise uses its superior bargaining position in order to gain a competitive 
advantage imposing on the other party a disadvantage, “unjustly in light of normal business 
practices”, then there is a risk that fair competition on the market might be impeded.165  
The eradication of such type of practices seems to be one of the leading goals pursued by 
the JFTC in the last few years. In November 2009, a task force on superior bargaining position 
has been established, and since 2007 the JFTC has issued approximately 20 warnings and cease 
and desist orders and more than 100 cautions to undertaking (retailers and hotels) whose 
practices could amount to infringements.
166
 
The provision against abuse of superior bargaining position is infringed when an 
undertaking, by making use of its superior bargaining position, unjustly in light of normal 
business practices engages in the following types of practices:  
a) Causes the other party (including a party with whom one newly intends to engage in 
continuous transactions) to purchase goods or services other than those to which said 
transactions pertain (tying); 
b) Causes the other party to provide money, services or other economic benefits;  
c) Refuses to receive goods in transactions with said party, causing said counterparty to 
take back such goods, delays payment or reduces the amount of payment, or otherwise 
establishes or changes trade terms or executes the transactions in a way disadvantageous to 
the other party.
167
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In EU such kind of practices are known as abuses of buyer power and the general 
thinking is that article 102 is not designed to tackle with such conducts.
168
 However, in the 
CICCE case the CJEU confirmed that a dominant purchaser could be an infringer of article 102. 
The case concerned an association of film producers who alleged that three French television 
companies were in breach of article 102 for setting unreasonably low license fees. The CJEU 
dismissed the claim against the television companies, because the association failed to prove that 
the prices were indeed unfair, but nonetheless it did not deny that such a practice when employed 
by a dominant buyer could amount to an infringement.
169
 Article 102 may not have been 
originally designed for these kind of situations, but nor was it designed to deal with exclusionary 
abuses and nonetheless it was successfully used for 30 years in the fight against foreclosure of 
competition. Moreover, there is nothing in its wording that would prevent the Commission from 
applying it against dominant retailers. 
Superior market power does not entail market-domination, however the market shares of 
the abusive enterprise are considered when assessing superior bargaining position. The supplier, 
from a need to expand its business, might find it more compelling to engage in transactions with 
retailers that have large market shares. Other factors considered by the JFTC that might reflect 
bargaining advantage are the degree of dependence of the supplier on the transaction, the 
possibility of the supplier to choose another retailer and other facts that might indicate the need 
of the supplier to carry out the transaction.
170
 
 Among the abuse of superior bargaining position cases pursued by the JFTC the most 
famous are the Toys“R”Us and Seven-Eleven cases. In 2011, the JFTC issued a cease and desist 
order and imposed a surcharge on Toys“R”Us, a retailer for children products, who unjustly 
returned the unsold goods to its suppliers and reduced the amount of considerations that were 
supposed to be paid to them.
171
 Seven-Eleven Japan was found by the JFTC to preclude some of 
its franchises from adopting discount sales of certain daily products and was ordered to refrain 
from the said conduct.
172
 In a more recent case, the JFTC imposed a surcharge of approximately 
9 million Euros (1274.16 million yen) on Direx, a retailer owning several discount stores in the 
Kyushu region, for forcing its suppliers to dispatch personnel and to provide monetary 
contributions for promotions which brought no benefit on the suppliers. Moreover, the suppliers 
were also compelled to bear the costs of the merchandize that was lost or damaged during a fire 
disaster at one of the Direx stores.
173
  
      
                                                          
168 
Kameoka Etsuko, Competition Law and Policy in Japan and the EU, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014, p. 89 
169
 Case C-298/83, Comité des industries cinématographiques des Communautés européennes (CICCE) v 
Commission of the European Communities[1985], ECLI:EU:C:1985:150 
170
 Guidelines Concerning Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position under the Antimonopoly Act, idem 165, p. 8 
171
 Cease and Desist Order and Surcharge Payment Order against Toys“R”Us-Japan, Ltd, December 13, 2011 
172
 Cease and Desist Order against Seven-Eleven Japan Co., Ltd., June 22, 2009 
173
 Cease and Desist Order and Surcharge Payment Order to DIREX Corporation, June 5, 2014 
Page 45 out of 57 
 
Chapter V Conclusions 
 
The post World War II period marks the moment when the first competition provisions 
where inked on paper in both EU and Japan.  The Sherman Antitrust Act served as a model for 
both the EU legislation as well as the AMA however the manner of implementation was 
overwhelmingly distinctive in the two territories.  Thus, the first research sub-question - how has 
the competition policy in the EU and Japan evolved over time? – will be addressed by firstly 
dwelling into the incentives that urged the central authorities to initiate the antitrust enforcement.  
In EU, organization that was in a commencement stage at the time, the provisions were 
directed mainly against collusive practices between undertakings; the prohibition was concocted 
to become a potent instrument for the eradication of cartels which at the time were perceived as a 
threat against the ardently contemplated market integration process. On the other hand in Japan, 
following the dissolution of the zaibatus, the Occupational Forces led by the USA imposed a 
radical antitrust system intended to prevent monopolization or concentration of power from 
never occurring again. Needless to say when the occupation ended in 1953 the AMA was 
amended to a less rigid version and 20 years later the noxious effects of cartelization on the 
market were experienced by the public. Thus the provisions against cartels and monopolistic 
situations were strengthened and a surcharge was introduced against infringers.  
The notion of abuse of dominant position as we know it today was the result of the efforts 
exerted by the German delegation during the negotiation of the EC Treaty which constitutes the 
foundation of EU competition law. In 1973, in the Continental Can case the CJEU clarified the 
confusion regarding the range of practices covered by the provision by stating that the 
exclusionary conducts fall under the prohibition as well.  
In the following period the degree of implementation of the antitrust provisions fluctuated 
in both of the jurisdictions and in the first half of the 21
st
 century a more modern approach was 
adopted in regard to the enforcement process.  In EU, a “decentralization” of the enforcement 
system took place with the Regulation 1/2003 delegating more power on the competition 
authorities of the member states and annulling the notification system. In Japan the surcharges 
were increased while the rather “byzantine” procedural system was replaced by a new one 
adjusted to the dynamics of the modern society.           
The second sub-question pursued by this study - what are the main structural features of 
the Japanese competition law and what are their correspondents in EU law? – is dealt with in 
the third chapter and starts by making a small excursion into the goals pursued by the 
competition policy in EU and Japan. While in EU the Commission declares as its main aim the 
consumer welfare, the Japanese AMA bestows a great deal of importance on the national 
economy together with the consumer interest. The system, in both countries, is designed to have 
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two levels. The first level is represented by the intermediate goals or direct objectives (effective 
competition), whereas the second level refers to the ultimate goals (consumer 
welfare/development of national economy and consumer interest). The mechanism employed is 
reaching the second level through the pursuit of the objectives from the first level by maintaining 
a fair and free competitive environment and the instruments used for that purpose are the legal 
prohibitions. 
The recipients of the competition policies are the undertakings, by EU standards, and 
enterprises, by Japanese standards. Despite some negligible differences, both of the two concepts 
embody the same type of entity engaged in economic activity.  
While the EU competition policy is concentrated in two TFEU articles, 101 prohibiting 
collusive behaviour and 102 prohibiting abuse of dominant position, the Japanese AMA has a 
more complex structure supported by 4 pillars: monopolization (monopolistic situations, private 
monopolization), unreasonable restraint of trade, unfair trade practices and mergers and stock 
acquisitions.  
The control over monopolistic situations was introduced in the light of the historical 
economic heritage of the country and has no correspondent in EU law. Moreover, in EU it has 
been emphasized that dominant position is not by itself illicit as long as the undertaking does not 
engage in abusing it. In Japan on the other hand, if the JFTC validates that a certain enterprise 
amounts to monopolistic situation in a particular field it has liberty to order it to take any 
measure necessary to counteract the anticompetitive effects. A monopolistic situation exists 
when two elements are cumulatively satisfied – a market structure element (when the value of 
goods on a particular market reaches a certain level) and a market performance element (when 
the price fluctuation on the market follows a particular pattern). 
Private monopolization refers to the type of conducts by which an enterprise or a group 
of enterprises excludes or controls the business activity of other entities causing, contrary to the 
public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in a particular field. The corresponding EU 
provision is the abuse of dominant position as the two concepts share a high degree of 
resemblance. Both provisions require a certain degree of market power (dominant position/ 
substantial restraint of competition) and proclaim a downright ban on practices designed to 
prevent the business activity of other entities and foreclose the market (exclusionary practices) as 
well as on practices involving manipulating the business activity of a weaker entity and placing it 
in a disadvantageous position (exploitative/control practices). It is necessary to mention that by 
Japanese standards, when a certain conduct is not found to be substantially restraining 
competition it is not immediately absolved of illegality. Even in the presence of lack of market 
power the unfair trade practices prohibition can still be triggered.   
In the past the concern towards the exclusionary practices was prevalent as both the 
Commission and the JFTC published guidelines in relation to the shape in which this kind of 
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practices can be encountered as well as in relation to the enforcement of the provision against 
such conducts. The likelihood that their outcomes amount to a partial elimination of competition 
is sufficient ground to judge a conduct abusive. Evidence that actual foreclosure occurred is not 
required. 
The correspondent of article 101 TFEU in the AMA is the unreasonable restraint of trade 
stipulation, however it is necessary to emphasize that the correspondence is only partial. The EU 
prohibition covers, legacy of the Consten and Grunding case, both horizontal and vertical 
agreements or concerted practices that affect trade between member states and have as their 
object or effect the prevention of competition. Unreasonable restraint of trade on the other hand 
is classified as any business activity between enterprises, materialized by contract, agreement or 
any other means, by which the entities mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in 
such a manner as to fix, maintain or increase prices or to limit production, technology, products, 
facilities or counterparties, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint 
of competition in any particular field of trade. In the Newspaper Distribution case the Tokyo 
High Court held that the expression “mutual restriction” predicates that all colluding parties need 
to adhere to the same kind of restrictions, condition which cannot be fulfilled in the case of 
vertical agreements. As a result the prohibition is directed only against cartels and other 
horizontal agreements.  
 Agreements between parties operating at different levels of the market are covered by 
the private monopolization clause when there is indication that they inflict a substantial restraint 
on competition. Otherwise, if the conduct only has a tendency to impede competition then it will 
fall under the umbrella of the unfair trade practices provision. Albeit in a few cases, where a 
certain degree of superior bargaining power is needed, undertakings which are not dominant in a 
particular field can become the target of the unfair trade practices provision. The conducts are 
listed in the Designation of Unfair Trade Practices Notice issued by the JFTC and include both 
conducts exclusionary in character as well as exploitative behaviours.  
In order to be able to proceed to the main research question of this study - how does the 
EU approach on the legal concept of exploitative abuse of dominant position reflect in the 
competition policy of Japan and what are the differences and similarities generated in regard to 
its enforcement in the two jurisdictions? – it is essential first to establish the correlation chart of 
the exploitative behaviours in the two territories. While in the EU the exploitative abuses of 
dominant position are prohibited by means of article 102 TFEU, the AMA has two provisions 
that serve that purpose. When the exploitative conduct is capable of substantially restraining 
competition then the abuse is considered to be private monopolization by control. On the other 
hand, if the harm inflicted on competition does not reach a considerable level but rather only has 
a tendency to inflict competition then the behaviour turns into an unfair trade practice.  
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Substantial restraint of competition, similarly to the dominant position concept refers to 
the powerful condition on the market enjoyed by an enterprise which endows it with a certain 
degree of independency from the competitive restraints of the market when conducting its 
business activity. Dominant position can exist only in relation to a relevant market whereas 
competition must be substantially restraint in a particular field trade. Relevant market and 
particular field of trade are synonym concepts and both compile two dimensions: a product 
market/scope and a geographical market/scope. The product market is identified in both 
jurisdictions based on demand substitutability and where the circumstances allow it on supply 
substitutability. The parameters considered are roughly the same, the most notable difference 
being that in relation to prices the JFTC employs a slightly different test from the one preferred 
by the Commission (SSNIP). 
After establishing the relevant market/particular field of trade both the Commission and 
the JFTC carry out the same method by examining the market shares of the alleged entity and of 
its competitors, the potential competitive pressure and the countervailing buyer 
power/countervailing bargaining power. There are no remarkable difference in the course of this 
process however it is paramount to observe that unlike the Commission the JFTC has to apply an 
after the fact approach when examining substantial restraint of competition. While in the EU the 
dominance on market is a prerequisite condition for an abuse to be established, in Japan the 
market domination can be the outcome of the abusive conduct and it is irrelevant if prior the 
enterprise was not very powerful on the market.      
As previously stated triggering the unfair trade practices clause does not entail market 
domination, in fact far from it, the JFTC is satisfied with as much as just a tendency to impede 
competition. Virtually if the conduct is likely to bring forth even a small degree of competitive 
harm it is enough to be considered a breach; actual anticompetitive effects do not need to be 
observed. This is the reason why the JFTC often resorts to classifying cases as unfair trade 
practices instead of private monopolization. In the 2008 Microsoft case the JFTC found the 
undertaking engaged in trading on restrictive terms practices and thus infringing section 12 of the 
Designation of Unfair Trade Practices Notice. Had the field of trade (PV audio-visual technology 
market) been narrowed down further a private monopolization case by control could have been 
established. The decision does not come as a surprise when taking into consideration the paltry 
case law on private monopolization.  
In EU holding market power burdens the undertaking with the so-called special 
responsibility. The doctrine first saw the light of day in the 1983 Michelin I case and basically 
predicates that a dominant undertaking can infringe the competition policy when engaged in 
practices which if employed by non-dominant entities would bear no legal repercussions. Such a 
concept does not exist in the Japanese policy, however considering that an unfair trade practice 
needs only to have a tendency to impede competition an unofficial form of such a concept can be 
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identified. Moreover, unlike the European one the Japanese “special responsibility” is addressed 
towards all enterprises regardless of their market power.  
The phrasing of the last sub-question addressed in this study is - What are the 
commonalities and dissimilarities between the concept of exploitative abuse and its Japanese 
counterparts private monopolization by control and exploitative unfair trade practice?  In order 
to proceed towards an answer it is necessary to note that both abuse of dominant position as well 
as private monopolization by control refer to the act of gaining material benefits to the detriment 
of another entity by making use of its superior market power. In both jurisdictions the common 
denominator is the proximity between the harm and the consumers as the aftermath of the 
conduct.  
The first difference that arises in connection with private monopolization is the fact that 
the provision can be infringed by exerting mere indirect control, unlike in EU were direct control 
is essential in every single case. The first and only case involving indirect control was the 1957 
Noda Soy-Sauce case, in which Noda’s conduct of raising the retail price of its soy-sauce 
functioned as a Ripple effect and within short time the soy-sauce supplied by the other players on 
the market reached the same price thresholds. The Tokyo High Court considered that Noda 
proved to have indirectly influenced the market and deemed its conduct as private 
monopolization by indirect control. In EU if such a situation were to occur it would  be regarded 
as mere tacit collusion, which no matter how much harm would deliver on the market it cannot 
be deemed illegal. 
The first forms of exploitative practices dealt with in this study are the discriminatory 
practices. Article 102(c) TFEU prohibits applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions while the AMA prohibits discriminatory consideration and discriminatory treatment 
on trade terms. In both jurisdictions the simple fact of applying different prices is not in itself 
illicit, however if the conduct has a potential negative influence on the competition between 
retailers or if the pricing system was adopted in order to partition the market then the prohibition 
is triggered.  
Trading on restrictive terms and its European equivalent unfair trading conditions 
portray the situation when an undertaking unjustly imposes restrictions on the business activity 
of another party.  The most representative example of such a practice is the non-assertion clause 
that Microsoft unilaterally inserted in all of the licensing agreements concluded with PC 
manufacturers in Japan. In EU the conduct of an undertaking, specialized in the management of 
copyrights, of requiring its members to assign both their current and past works as well as the 
practice of exercising the rights of its former members for 5 years following their withdrawal 
were deemed by the Commission as unfair trading conditions. A film distributor coercing the 
cinema theatres broadcasting their films to apply a certain admission fee was found by the JFTC 
to be an unfair trade practice while the Commission classified the conduct of an undertaking 
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unilaterally determining the prices of the supplements to the contract as an infringement of 
article 102 TFEU.  
In the cases General Motors and United Brands the CJEU established that when an 
undertaking charges an excessive price that cannot be justified in the light of the economic value 
of the product it is in breach of the 102 prohibition. In Japan imposing an excessive price is not 
covered by the unfair trade practices prohibition. Although there has been no record of such a 
case so far, if such behaviour would substantially restraint competition it could fall under the 
private monopolization provision.   
Tying, a type of practice that has garnered a lot of attention due to its ability to exclude 
competition, was originally treated as an exploitative abuse due to its harmful effects directed 
against consumers. Its implementation functions similarly in both EU and Japan. In the 2007 
Microsoft case the General Court deemed the act of supplying the Windows OS with Windows 
Media Player pre-installed as “coercion”. In Hilti the CJEU emphasized that such a practice 
results in a limitation in relation to the consumer choice. Canon was also subjected in 2004 to a 
JFTC investigation for allegedly manufacturing its printers so that they wouldn’t work properly 
with recycled cartridges produced by other enterprises.   
Perhaps the most notable difference between the two legislations is the fact that the 
Japanese AMA covers a wider array of practices, conferring the JFTC with a broader authority to 
get involved in practices that might cross paths with other areas of law. One such practice is 
interference with a competitor’s transaction which in most cases entails exerting pressure on 
intermediates (retailers) and instructing them either not to honour their contractual obligations 
with a competitor or not to conclude such an agreement with a competitor of the alleged 
enterprise.  As an example, it is worth mentioning Yonex who threatened their retailers and the 
organizers of badminton events that they will stop supplying their shuttlecocks in case they chose 
to also sell or use shuttlecocks provided by competitors. Similarly, the practice of a mobile SNS 
operator of urging game developers not to provide their games on the SNS platform of a 
competitor was considered an infringement by the JFTC. In EU, a similar situation occurred in 
the United Brands case where the dominant undertaking refused to supply their bananas to a 
retailer involved in an advertisement campaign for the bananas of a competitor. The practice was 
classified refusal to supply, however it would have been interesting to find out how the 
Commission would have dealt with the case if United Brands wouldn’t have actually 
discontinued its supply but only threatened to do so.  
Another unfair trade practice provision that is unique to the Japanese competition policy, 
with no correspondent in EU law is deceptive customer inducement. The most common cases are 
the ones concerning misleading representation on quality and misleading representation on 
country of origin. 
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 One of the main priorities pursued by the JFTC in the past few years was identifying and 
eliminating the situations where an enterprise makes use of its superior bargaining position and 
unjustly in the light of normal business practices determines another party either to buy goods or 
services other than those pertaining to the transaction, or to provide money, services or other 
economic benefits, or refuses to receive the transaction goods, delays the payment or otherwise 
executes the agreement in a way disadvantageous to the other party. The prohibition is directed 
towards abuses performed from the downstream level of the market, by retailers, against the 
suppliers from the upstream level of the market. In Europe, such practices are known as abuses 
of dominant buyer power, however unlike in Japan, the Commission has rarely if ever displayed 
any concerned towards their anticompetitive effects. The CJEU has nonetheless predicated in the 
CICCE case that dominant buyers can become infringers within the meaning of article 102 
TFEU.  
To conclude, the exploitative abuses of dominant position and their Japanese 
correspondents - private monopolization by control and unfair trade practices - reflect a lot of 
common features related to the type of prohibited conducts and the way they are enforced. This 
does not come as a surprise when considering that both jurisdictions hold the protection of the 
consumers as one of their leading goals. At the same time a lot of differences arise, the most 
notable being the degree of market power required to trigger the prohibition, or lack of it for that 
matter, and the wider spectrum of authority that the JFTC has, enabling it to intervene in matters 
that go outside the jurisdiction of the Commission.        
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